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I. INTRODUCTION
Only recently have our public schools been recognized as harbors
for protected first amendment activity. "It can hardly be argued that
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."' When the United
States Supreme Court confidently made this bold statement, however,
free speech rights of students or teachers in the public schools were
anything but indisputable. In fact, in cases decided before 1968, it was
very rare indeed to see discussion of first amendment rights in public
schools.2
The traditional approach to claimed first amendment violations by
teachers was to dismiss those claims summarily. Courts considered
themselves bound by a line of thought exemplified by Justice Holmes'
1. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
2. Graham, Freedom of Speech of the Public School Teacher, 19 CLEV. ST. L. REv.
382 (1970).
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early comment that "[t]here are few employments for hire in which
the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional rights to free
speech ... by the implied terms of his contract."3 Cases in which
teachers challenged the constitutional validity of school board action
were, therefore, decided on the basis that the teacher occupied a dual
role: She was primarily a public employee, and secondarily a citizen.
Thus, by accepting employment in the public schools, a person would
indeed, contrary to Tinker, shed some constitutional rights.
After having been restated and reshaped in numerous lower court
decisions,4 this traditional view found approval in a 1952 Supreme
Court case.5 In Adler v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court up-
held a New York statute which prohibited those advocating overthrow
of the government from teaching in public schools. The Court dis-
played its approval of the traditional view with the observation that
teachers "have no right to work for the state in the school system on
their own terms."6 This hostility toward teacher first amendment
claims continued well into the 1960s.
In 1968, the Court began laying the foundation for a new analysis
in these cases with its decision in Pickering v. Board of Education.7
Pickering and subsequent Supreme Court cases established a frame-
work of analysis which, after twenty years of refinement, the courts
now appear to apply consistently. In attempting to lay a certain ana-
lytical framework, however, courts have been remiss in their duty to
step back and look at the larger picture. Does this analysis adequately
protect teacher free speech? Does it provide certainty to administra-
tors and teachers as to what actions they are permitted to take? Is the
3. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18 (1892).
4. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Swan, 41 Cal. 2d 546, 261 P.2d 261 (1953); Goldsmith v.
Board of Educ., 66 Cal. App. 157, 172, 225 P. 783, 789 (1924)("No one has a natural
or inherent right to teach in a public school"); State v. Turner, 155 Fla. 270,19 So.
2d 832 (1944); Joyce v. Board of Educ., 325 IM. App. 543, 60 N.E.2d 431, 435
(1945) (teacher dismissed for writing letter congratulating former student for fail-
ing to register for the draft; court responded by saying that a teacher '%vriting
such a letter ought not to be permitted to continue as a teacher in public
schools"). The approach of these early courts to teacher free speech cases is epit-
omized by the following quotation:
Nor can defendant prevail in her claim that affirmance of her dismissal
infringes upon the constitutional guarantee of her freedom of speech, in
that she is denied the right to criticise her superiors upon pain of losing
her position.... One employed in public service does not have a consti-
tutional right to such employment and is subject to reasonable supervi-
sion and restriction by the governmental body or officer to the end that
proper discipline may be maintained....
Board of Educ. v. Swan, 41 Cal. 2d 546, 553, 261 P.2d 261, 267-68 (1953).
5. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
6. Id at 492.
7. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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analysis capable of uniform application? Does it allow courts to dis-
criminate against unpopular viewpoints?
In the courts' attempts to discern and apply the proper analysis in
teacher free speech cases, these larger issues, unfortunately, have
been ignored. This article will focus on these larger issues, as well as
on the adequacies and inadequacies of the Pickering test as it is now
applied in the federal courts. First, the Pickering test and its develop-
ment in the Supreme Court will be discussed. This discussion will fo-
cus on Pickering itself and the four Supreme Court cases which, since
Pickering, have shaped teacher free speech analysis in some fashion.
Second, the article will focus on how the lower federal courts are ap-
plying the modified Pickering analysis. Finally, an analysis of the test
from the perspective of the three professionals most intimately in-
volved (the educator, the litigator, and the lobbyist) is needed in order
to highlight deficiencies. Suggestions, both judicial and legislative,
will be made to improve areas of the test which seem to breed more
confusion than certainty.
II. BASIC LESSONS-THE SUPREME COURT FOUNDATION
A. Pickering v. Board of Education
After twenty years, Pickering remains the seminal case on the is-
sue of a teacher's first amendment rights. Marvin Pickering, a high
school teacher in Illinois, sent a letter to a local newspaper that was
critical of the revenue policies of the local school board.8 The letter
came on the heels of an announcement for a proposed tax rate hike to
fund educational activities. The proposal eventually was defeated. 9
Pickering's letter advocating defeat of the proposal was published only
one week after supportive letters written by the superintendent and
local teacher's organization appeared.
Marvin Pickering was fired after the letter appeared because the
letter was deemed to be "detrimental to efficient operation of schools
in the district."10 Pickering sought review of this determination in
county court, which upheld his dismissal. He then appealed to the Illi-
nois Supreme Court, where his firing once again was upheld. He then
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, claiming that the firing
constituted state action in violation of the first and fourteenth
amendments.
The Court reversed the determination below, holding that Picker-
ing's dismissal was unconstitutional. In so doing, the Court made no
doubt that the rationale and reasoning of Adler v. Board of Educa-
8. Id. at 564.
9. Id at 566. The letter, in addition to attacking revenue procedures, also criticized
the superintendent for threatening those teachers who opposed the tax hike.
10. Id at 564.
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tion' no longer controlled teacher free speech cases. "The theory
that public employment which may be denied altogether may be sub-
jected to any conditions regardless of how unreasonable, has been uni-
formly rejected."12 Instead, the Court indicated that the task of the
Court was to balance the interests of the employee, as a citizen,
against the interests of the school board, as employer.1 3
In announcing this balancing test, the Court explicitly refused to
lay down a "general standard" by which all teacher first amendment
claims would be judged.14 Factors which would be considered relevant
to the determination of whether the teacher's speech was protected
included the need for harmony among workers, relational factors be-
tween the speaker and his subject, the degree to which the speech ad-
dresses matters of public concern, and special knowledge which
teachers possess concerning operation of schools, making it essential
that teachers be able to "speak freely" on such topics.1 5 On the facts
of the case, Marvin Pickering's statements had not created any disrup-
tion in the operation of the schools; his expression was, therefore, held
to merit constitutional protection.16
11. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
12. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (quoting Keyishian v. Board
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967)). Keyishian involved a challenge to the
same New York statute which had been upheld in Adler. Noting that the "consti-
tutional doctrine which has emerged since [Adler] has rejected its major prem-
ise," the Court struck down the portions of the statute (different from those
challenged in Adler) because they were overbroad. Appellants in Keyishian had
refused to certify that they were not communists, as the statute required, and had
therefore been discharged. Keyishian retains its significance today because of its
strong endorsement of the classroom as a first amendment playground. "The
classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas."' Keyishian v. Board of Re-
gents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). Thus, in cases involving academic freedom, Keyi-
shian provides great protection to the educator.
13. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). Even at this early stage in
teacher free speech litigation, however, the Court began to narrow free speech
rights by focusing on the nature of the expression involved.
14. Id at 569. Interestingly, Marvin Pickering had claimed that the actual malice
standard of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), should govern these
cases. On the facts of this case, the standard would have provided adequate pro-
tection to Pickering. Advocates of free speech, however, may have had cause for
alarm, given that Sullivan initially applied only to public officials. Teachers,
therefore, would have been free to comment on school board members with a full
cloak of first amendment protection. All other statements apparently would be
unprotected.
15. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571-73 (1968). Ironically, the Court
noted both that Mr. Pickering had to be free to comment knowingly about school
revenue questions (because of his inside position as a teacher) and that Picker-
ing's statements here were matters on which he had no expertise. The Court
concluded that Pickering's statements were false and that, far from creating tur-
moil in the working environment, they were met largely with apathy and disbe-
lief. Id. at 570.
16. The court explicitly left open the question of whether statements made which
[Vol. 67:695
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The groundwork for future constitutional analysis had been laid.
Pickering remains today an important component of the test evaluat-
ing the measure of protection which teacher expression receives.
B. Mt Healthy v. Doyle
The second crucial case decided in the area of teacher freedom of
expression, Mt Healthy City School District Board of Education v.
Doyle,1 7 involved a topic of much less controversy--causation. Doyle
was a somewhat argumentative non-tenured teacher who had been
teaching, under a series of one- and two-year contracts, for five years.
In his third year of teaching, he was elected president of the local
teacher's association. Negotiating tension developed between the
board and the association in ensuing years. During this time, Doyle
was involved in some incidents unrelated to his position in the associa-
tion; during one such incident, Doyle argued with a fellow teacher
who eventually slapped him. Disciplinary action taken against Doyle
resulted in a teacher walkout.'s
Among other incidents,19 the straw which finally broke the camel's
back was a phone call Doyle made to a local radio station. Doyle, after
receiving a memorandum on teacher dress from the board, called a
local radio station and relayed the contents of the memorandum to
them. The radio station subsequently announced adoption of the
memo as the new teacher dress code. The court of appeals found that
consideration of this phone call in the board's decision whether to re-
hire constituted a denial of Doyle's first and fourteenth amendment
rights. 2 0
The district court had held that if constitutionally protected activ-
ity played a "substantial" role in the board's decision not to rehire, the
decision was constitutionally flawed. On this basis, they ordered
Doyle reinstated. The Supreme Court disagreed with this test, and,
therefore, ordered the case remanded for further factual findings.21
"The constitutional principle at stake is sufficiently vindicated if
such an employee is placed in no worse a position than if he had not
were knowingly false or made with reckless disregard for the truth (the actual
malice standard) would or could be protected under this balancing test. Id at 574
n.6. Justice White dissented on the grounds that statements made with actual
malice were entitled to no constitutional protection regardless of their impact on
the harmony of the school system. Id. at 584 (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). See also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
17. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
18. Id. at 281.
19. Doyle also argued with cafeteria employees about the amount of spaghetti served
him, referred to two students as "sons of bitches," and directed an "obscene ges-
ture" at two girls who had failed to obey his commands. Id- at 281-82.
20. IA at 282.
21. Id at 285-87.
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engaged in the [constitutionally protected] conduct." 22 The Court ob-
served that application of the causation test espoused by the district
court might well afford the teacher greater protection than if the con-
stitutionally protected activity had never occurred. It was, therefore,
necessary to add additional gloss to the test laid out by the district
court. First, the teacher must show that the protected activity was a
"substantial" or "motivating" factor in the decision not to rehire. Af-
ter the teacher meets this burden, the board can nonetheless escape
liability if it can show, by a preponderance of the evidence, "that it
would have reached the same decision as to respondent's re-employ-
ment even in the absence of the protected conduct."23 Thus, a two-
part causation test has been uniformly applied in teacher free speech
cases.
C. Givhan v. Western Line
Thus far, all the cases discussed concerned action taken by a school
board in response to public speeches made by the teacher. In Givhan
v. Western Line Consolidated School District,2 4 the Court first consid-
ered the question of whether teacher speech occurring in a private
context would be subject to constitutional protection as well. A unani-
mous Court answered this question affirmatively.
Bessie Givhan, a junior high teacher, had complained numerous
times to school administrators about policies and educational practices
at the school that she perceived to be racially discriminatory. The dis-
trict court found that these complaints were the "primary" reason for
the board's decision not to rehire, and ordered Givhan reinstated.25
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, reversed on the basis
that private expression was beyond the constitutional protection ex-
tended in Pickering.26
The Supreme Court reversed, upholding constitutional protection
for private as well as public expression. "Although the First Amend-
ment's protections of government employees extends to private as
well as public expression, striking the Pickering balance in each con-
22. Id. at 285-86.
23. Id at 287. On analytical grounds, the Court's analysis here seems similar to the
"harmless error" rule: There was a constitutional violation, but no real harm
resulted because the teacher would have been fired anyway. As such, the reason-
ing of the Court seems unassailable. Practically, however, the test appears to
open the door to post-hoe rationalizations of a constitutionally suspect decision
not to rehire.
24. 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
25. Id. at 413.
26. Ayers v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 555 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1977). The
appeals court believed that protection of such private complaints would force
school principals to become "ombudsmen, for damnable as well as noble causes."
Id at 1319.
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text may involve different considerations." 27 If speech is made in pub-
lic, then the content of the speech will be determinative of whether
the teacher was hindered in his ability to perform duties properly. In
private expression, however, content as well as the time, place, and
manner of the speech will be determinative.28 Because the courts be-
low had applied an incorrect analysis (in both the causation and con-
stitutional areas), the case was remanded for further fact finding.29
Subsequent Supreme Court cases make Givhan's primary holding,
that private as well as public teacher expression is entitled to constitu-
tional protection, somewhat questionable.3 0 The case has not been
overruled, however, and still may be of considerable value to litigants
seeking to assert first amendment rights relating to private
expression.
D. Connick v. Myers
Along with Pickering, Connick v. Myers3 ' stands as the primary
case for consideration of free speech rights in teacher employment
cases. While Connick did not involve first amendment rights of a
teacher, it did substantially alter the Pickering analysis. Connick set
the contemporary tone of first amendment analysis in teacher employ-
ment cases.
Ms. Myers, an attorney with the district attorney's office, distrib-
uted a questionnaire that sought her co-worker's opinions in areas of
office morale, supervisor trust, and political pressure within the of-
fice.32 The questionnaire had been prepared after Myers had learned
of her impending transfer to another office-a transfer she opposed.
Upon learning of the questionnaire's circulation, Myers's superior
promptly fired her for "insubordination."3 3 She subsequently filed
suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.
The district court held that Myers's constitutional rights had been
violated. In so doing, the court found that the matters addressed in
the questionnaire were of public concern, and that the state had not
met its burden of showing "substantial" interference with office func-
tions sufficient to justify Myers's termination.3 4 The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Court, in a 5-4 decision, reversed. "When employee expression
cannot be fairly considered as relating to any political, social, or other
27. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415 n.4 (1979).
28. Id.
29. Id at 416-17.
30. See infra note 36.
31. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
32. Id. at 141.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 142. See Myers v. Connick, 507 F. Supp. 752 (E.D. La. 1981).
19881
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concern to the community, government officials should enjoy wide lat-
itude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the ju-
diciary in the name of the First Amendment."3 Thus, the analysis
invoked by the Court was clearly expanded to two parts: first, was the
speech of public concern; second, how do the Pickering balancing fac-
tors apply?
When addressing the initial public concern prong of the test, the
content, form, and context of the speech must be considered.36 The
one factor that the Court seemed to rely on in Myers was context; My-
ers was not seeking to "inform the public," or "bring to light actual or
potential wrongdoing."3 7 Instead, the expression at issue arose in the
context of a private employment dispute--an issue the Court charac-
terized as important only to Myers. An employee who speaks not as a
citizen, but rather as a self-interested employee, will not be entitled to
constitutional protection.38 Thus, focusing on the speaker's motive for
speaking appears to be crucial under this analysis.
After concluding that the content, form, and context of Myers's
questionnaire called for a conclusion that it addressed matters of pri-
vate concern, the Court turned to the Pickering balancing factors.
Having held that the speech was not of public concern, the Court con-
cluded that it was "unnecessary... to scrutinize the reasons for [My-
ers's] discharge."39 Thus, for the first time, the Court made it clear
that the public concern inquiry was a threshold issue which the
teacher must overcome in order to challenge board action on constitu-
tional grounds. Only after the teacher shows that the expression dealt
35. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983).
36. Id at 147-48. The Court, in announcing this test, attempted to square it with the
result in Givhan. See supra notes 24-30. While Givhan's statements were ex-
pressed in private, the Court in Connick nonetheless regarded them as addressing
matters of public concern. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,146 (1983). While it is
easy to see that matters of public concern can be addressed in private, the test
that the Court espoused to determine public concern militates against the Court's
own conclusion. Anytime a teacher is fired for private expression, two prongs of
the Connick public concern test, form and context, will strongly support a finding
that the speech was not of public concern.
37. Id at 148.
38. Id at 147. The Court did leave open the possibility that, under "most unusual
circumstances," a teacher speaking as a self-interested employee might nonethe-
less be entitled to first amendment protection. These possible circumstances,
however, were not delineated.
The Court did say that speech, even on private matters, is not totally devoid of
constitutional value. "We in no sense suggest that speech on private matters falls
into one of the narrow and well-defined classes of expression which carries so
little social value, such as obscenity, that the State can prohibit and punish such
expression by all persons in its jurisdiction." Id- Thus, while an employee may be
fired for such speech, other state action, such as prosecution for libelous private
statements, may still be subject to constitutional scrutiny.
39. Id at 146.
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with matters of public concern does the Pickering balancing test be-
come crucial.4 0
One portion of Myers's questionnaire was held to be of public con-
cern.41 Therefore, with respect to this single question, the Court was
forced to employ the Pickering balancing test. Employment of the
balancing test in Connick involved granting to public employers "a
wide degree of deference" because "close working relationships" were
essential to the proper functioning of the District Attorney's Office.42
Consideration of factors such as the time, place, and manner of the
questionnaire distribution, the context in which the expression arose,
and the need to avoid office disruption before it occurs led the Court to
conclude that Myers's discharge violated none of her free speech
rights.43
Justice Brennan, dissenting with three other Justices, appparently
would have reversed the order in which the majority applied the two
separate inquiries that must be made.
[Whether a public employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern is
relevant to the constitutional inquiry only when the statements at issue-by
virtue of their content or the context in which they were made-may have an
adverse impact on the government's ability to perform its duties efficiently.44
The dissent also took issue with the majority's finding that potential
or possible office disruption was sufficient to justify Myers's
termination.4 5
In spite of the criticism raised in the dissent, Connick's analytical
framework stands today as the accepted analysis of teacher free
40. Whether the speech is of public concern is an issue of law to be decided by the
court. Page v. DeLaune, 837 F.2d 233, 237 (5th Cir. 1988). Thus, Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56(c) becomes an important weapon for state attorneys. If the
court decides that the speech was of private concern, Rule 56(c) may be used to
dispose of the case through summary judgment. See Ferrara v. Mills, 781 F.2d
1508, 1514 (11th Cir. 1986). Summary judgment after a finding that the speech
was of private concern remains prevalent in spite of the Supreme Court's com-
ment that, under unusual circumstances, termination after such speech could be
constitutionally actionable. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983); see
aZso supra note 38.
41. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,149 (1983). The question which was held to impli-
cate a matter of public concern dealt with whether the attorneys in the office
ever felt "pressured to work in political campaigns on behalf of office supported
candidates." Id The Court characterized this question as dealing with a matter
of public concern without any reference to the content, form, and context test
which it had just promulgated. Possibly the Court considered the content of the
speech as "inherently a matter of public concern," so that reference to the other
two factors seemingly would be unnecessary. If, however, the Court believed that
there were topics of inherent public concern, perhaps, in the interest of certainty,
some of those topics should be set forth.
42. Id. at 151-52.
43. Id. at 152-54.
44. Id. at 157 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 158 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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speech cases. Combined with Pickering, Connick provides a two-part
analysis that places a heavy burden on the teacher seeking to sustain a
constitutional claim. First, the teacher must show that the expression
at issue pertains to matters of public concern. Second, the Pickering
balance must reveal that the teacher's interest in speaking outweighs
the government's interests as employer. Coupled with the stiff causa-
tion requirements outlined in Mt. Healthy,46 these constitutional tests
place substantial barriers before a teacher seeking to challenge her
dismissal on first amendment grounds.
E. Rankin v. McPherson
The final and most recent Supreme Court case for discussion is
Rankin v. McPherson.47 Like Connick, Rankin did not deal specifi-
cally with teacher employment, but rather with the broader subject of
public employment in general. Rankin's application of the public con-
cern test, however, has played some significance in recently decided
teacher employment cases.
Ardith McPherson, a nineteen-year-old deputy in a county consta-
ble's office, was fired after a co-employee overheard a conversation
she had with her boyfriend, also an employee in the office. While dis-
cussing the state of welfare assistance in the United States after an
attempt on the President's life, Ms. McPherson commented: "if they
go for him again, I hope they get him" (referring to the President).48
As a result of making this comment, McPherson was fired.
She challenged her dismissal on first amendment grounds, the dis-
trict court twice granting summary judgment for the defendant. The
Fifth Circuit reversed both times, finally holding that McPherson's
statements concerned matters important to the public, and that her
interest in making the comment outweighed the employer's interest in
firing her.4 9
A sharply divided Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's de-
terminations. To do so, the Court was required to find that McPher-
son's comments related to matters of public concern. The opinion of
the Court, a four-justice plurality, concluded that McPherson's speech
was a commentary on the policies of the administration.5 0 While only
one of the Connick public concern factors, context, was specifically
mentioned, both the form and the content of the statement entered
into the plurality's determination that the speech addressed issues of
public concern.5 '
46. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
47. 107 S. Ct. 2891 (1987).
48. McPherson v. Rankin, 786 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1986).
49. Id.
50. McPherson v. Rankin, 107 S. Ct. 2891, 2897-98 (1987).
51. Id.
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After determining that the statement was of public concern, the
Court went on to the Pickering balance. In this portion of its analysis,
the Court cleared up a point that had been unclear in Connick: The
state '"ears a burden of justifying the discharge on legitimate
grounds."5 2 In meeting this burden, the State must focus on its pri-
mary interest in discharge cases-assuring that "the effective func-
tioning of the public employer's enterprise" will not be hampered.53
The Court found that the government had not met its burden, pay-
ing particular attention to McPherson's authority and position in the
office. '"there, as here, an employee serves no confidential, policy
making, or public contact role, the danger to the agency's successful
function from that employee's private speech is minimal."54
Rankin stands as an example of how far the public concern test
may be stretched. Comments which the dissent characterized as "only
one step removed from statements that we have previously held enti-
tled to no First Amendment protection even in the nonemployment
context"55 were held to address matters of public concern, entitled to
the most prominent first amendment position. Teachers seeking to
establish that their comments addressed matters of public concern
might find assistance by comparing their comments to McPherson's.
Rankin brings us up to date on the Supreme Court's fashioning of
an analytical framework by which to evaluate teacher first amend-
ment claims. Pickering and Connick together establish a set analysis
that seems ordered and certain. An examination of post-Connick
lower court opinions is necessary to reveal how those courts imple-
ment the Pickering-Connick test in educational employment
situations.
52. Id. at 2898 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983)).
53. Id. at 2899.
54. Id at 2900. It is apparent from the opinion that the Court was concerned about
the inappropriate or controversial nature of McPherson's statements. "Vigilance
is necessary to ensure that public employers do not use authority over employees
to silence discourse, not because it hampers public functions but simply because
superiors disagree with the content of the employees' speech." Id at 2896.
In essence, the opinion returns us to the question implicitly addressed in the
Connick case: Which portion of the Connick-Pickering test should be applied
first? Should the state first be required to prove that the functioning of its
agency will be hampered? Or should the teacher be required to first show that
her statements addressed issues of public concern? Rankin illustrates how the
public concern test can be diluted if the statement clearly will not hamper agency
functioning. In any situation in which an employee has been terminated for com-
ments which clearly would not affect the functioning of the agency, courts may
be hesitant to grant summary judgment to the employer because the speech was
not of public concern. Thus, the courts may simply water down the public con-
cern test to assure that private but harmless discourse remains protected.
55. Id. at 2903 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia compared McPherson's com-
ments to "fighting words," "epithets or personal abuse, and advocacy of force or
violence." Id. (citations omitted).
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III. HOW THE TEST WORKS: AN ANALYSIS OF LOWER
COURT DECISIONS APPLYING THE PICKER ING-
CONNICK TEST
Only recently have courts applied the Pickering-Connick test in a
coherent fashion. The primary source of confusion first arose with re-
spect to the two differing prongs of the test; some courts, even after
the decision in Connick, appeared to focus only on the Pickering bal-
ancing factors. Other courts combined the Pickering and Connick
tests into a single inquiry, not differentiating the factors that each test
uniquely employs.56 In Ferrara v. Mills,57 the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit noted the confusion with respect to the factors
applied in the different prongs of the test:
Several courts which the parties rely upon fail to enunciate clearly that the
analysis consists of three separate and progressive steps. The question of
whether the employee's speech is constitutionally protected is a different issue
from the ultimate question of whether the employer has violated the em-
ployee's right to freedom of speech.5 8
The problems regarding initial application of the analysis were
largely semantic, however, and for the most part these problems have
been resolved. An independent and detailed focus on how the lower
courts are applying Connick's public concern test and Pickering's bal-
ancing test nonetheless provides insight into the manner in which dif-
ferent fact patterns are resolved by the federal courts.
A. Connick Public Concern Test
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the public concern test is the
inability of courts to agree on what statements are of public concern.
In an attempt to incorporate some certainty in this area, one court
56. For example, in Hamer v. Brown, 831 F.2d 1398 (8th Cir. 1987), the court outlined
a three-prong test, the first prong of which asked whether the plaintiff had en-
gaged in any protected activity. Incorporated into this prong was the Pickering-
Connick test. Id. at 1401.
The remaining two factors concerned causation. See Cox v. Dardanelle Public
School Dist., 790 F.2d 668, 672 (8th Cir. 1986).
57. 781 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1986).
58. Id. at 1513 (citations omitted). Interestingly, one of the cases which the court
cites as indicative of this confusion is McPherson v. Rankin, 736 F.2d 175 (5th Cir.
1984). Recall that the United States Supreme Court, on appeal in Rankin, af-
firmed the decision of the Fifth Circuit. See McPherson v. Rankin, 107 S. Ct. 2897
(1987).
Even the Eighth Circuit has encountered internal semantic difficulties, but
has now seemingly overcome them. "In Cox v. Dardanelle Public School Dist., a
panel of this court referred to a two-step process. The panel noted that Connick
provides a 'public concern' test and that Pickering provides a balancing test.' We
have no disagreement here; we simply speak of a combined 'protected speech'
inquiry and two further steps relating to causation." Lewis v. Harrison School
Dist. No. 1, 805 F.2d 310, 313 n.4 (8th Cir. 1986)(citations omitted).
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merely listed the factual circumstances in which the Supreme Court
has concluded that topics are of public concern.5 9 Given the Supreme
Court's admonitions that these cases will be handled on a case-by-case
basis, however, such a listing provides little guidance. Unless the fac-
tual setting is identical to one previously encountered, the court must
engage in an independent content, form, and context analysis.
Separating these three factors and analyzing them independently
may, at first blush, seem wise. Upon an examination of the case law,
however, the futility of such an approach becomes readily apparent.
Under some views, for example, certain topics are of "inherent" public
concern merely due to their content; an analysis of the context and
form of these topics would, therefore, be superfluous. 60 Furthermore,
few courts appear to separate out the three factors and discuss them
independently. Instead, a general analysis of the entire communica-
tive event is used-something akin to a "totality of the circumstances"
test.6 1
A review of the lower court decisions on this issue reveals one fac-
tor that, time and again, appears to play a significant role in determin-
ing whether a particular expression implicates matters of public
concern. The "role" of the speaker, or the speaker's "motive" in mak-
ing the statements in question, is a factor that some courts seem to
indicate is determinative, in and of itself, of the public concern
question.62
This role or motive analysis is drawn directly from language in
Connick: "The repeated emphasis in Pickering on the right of the
public employee 'as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern,' was not accidental."63 Courts have taken this "as a citizen"
language and incorporated it as a part of Connick's public concern test.
59. Page v. DeLaune, 837 F.2d 233, 237-38 (5th Cir. 1988). The list of topics which
were of public concern included. 1) welfare policies; 2) attempts on the Presi-
dent's life; 3) need for increased school taxes; 4) special police treatment for
wealthier people; 5) controversial federally funded reading programs; 6) powers
of the county commission. Id.
60. See Note, The Public Employee Can Disagree with the Boss-Sometimes, 66 NEB.
L. REV. 601, 613 (1987). At least one court appears to have expressly rejected the
notion that certain topics are of inherent public concern. Callaway v. Hafeman,
832 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1987).
Hence, while it is undoubtedly true that incidences of sexual harassment
in a public school district are inherently matters of public concern, the
Connick test requires us to look at the point of the speech in question:
was the employee's point to bring wrongdoing to light? Or to raise other
issues of public concern, because they are of public concern? Or was the
point to further some purely private interest?
Id. at 417 (quoting Linhart v. Glatfelter, 771 F.2d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 1985)(em-
phasis supplied)).
61. See, e.g., Terrell v. University of Texas Sys. Police, 792 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1986).
62. See Callaway v. Hafeman, 832 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1987).
63. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983).
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The focus is on the role the employee has assumed in advancing the particular
expressions: That of a concerned public citizen, informing the public that the
state institution is not properly discharging its duties, or engaged in some way
in misfeasance, malfeasance or nonfeasance; or merely as an employee, con-
cerned only with internal policies or practices which are of relevance only to
the employees of that institution.6 4
A fair reading of Pickering and Connick, however, is inconclusive
on of whether the role or motive of the speaker should be considered
part of the public concern test. Arguably, the motive or role of the
speaker should become important only in the Pickering balancing
test; if the teacher was speaking as a citizen, then the first amendment
concerns will be weightier. If the teacher was speaking as an em-
ployee, then the balance will tip towards the state. Such an interpre-
tation squares with Pickering's recommendation that the interests of
the teacher be balanced against the interests of the state.
Be that as it may, courts nonetheless consider the role of the
speaker as indicative of public concern. Courts which characterize
teacher speech as "airing private employer-employee grievances"65 or
motivated primarily by the teacher's own self-interest 66 are likely to
hold that the speech does not deal with matters of public concern. A
brief review of some cases employing this role or motive analysis
proves illustrative.
In Page v. DeLaune,67 a Texas A & M CETA supervisor of an ex-
offender program was fired after her boss overheard a telephone con-
versation between Page (the fired employee) and another worker.
The two discussed their intention to go "over the head" of their super-
visor and complain about the manner in which the ex-offender pro-
gram was being managed. Page eventually brought suit claiming that
the firing violated, among other things, her first amendment rights.
The district court dismissed her first amendment claim.6 8
The court of appeals affirmed, focusing primarily on the role that
Page occupied when speaking. When determining whether an em-
ployee's speech dealt with matters of public concern, the court consid-
ered its task as reviewing "the speech and its context."69 After citing
the language in Connick referring to the citizen-employee dichotomy,
the court determined that Page was acting as an employee while
speaking in this case. "The telephone conversation between Page and
Witte-Howell chiefly concerned the decision of both employees to go
over DeLaune's head and speak to her supervisor, Turner. Such a de-
cision to bypass normal communication channels is clearly a personnel
64. Cox v. Dardanelle Pub. School Dist., 790 F.2d 668, 672 (8th Cir. 1986).
65. ME
66. Piver v. Pender County Bd. of Educ., 835 F.2d 1076 (4th Cir. 1987).
67. 837 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1988).
68. Id. at 237.
69. Id. No mention of the third Connick factor-form-was made.
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matter internal to the program, not a matter of public concern."70 Be-
cause the two were speaking as employees on matters internal to the
program, their speech was not entitled to constitutional protection.71
Perhaps the most disturbing and restrictive public concern analysis
was performed by the Eleventh Circuit in Ferrara v. Mills.72 In Fer-
rara, a high school teacher spoke out against a system of registration
that made it difficult for him to control his classes. He also criticized
the practice of filling teacher vacancies in the social studies depart-
ment with physical education teachers, some of whom were not certi-
fied in that area. After being assigned what he considered an
inadequate teaching schedule, he filed a Section 1983 action alleging
violations of his rights to free speech.73
The district court dismissed Ferrara's complaint on the basis that
the expression at issue "constitute[d] nothing more than a series of
grievances with school administrators over internal school policies."74
The court of appeals affirmed. "Ferrara concedes that he spoke out
against collegiate registration because it contributed to his inability to
maintain control of students and to effectively enforce discipline....
Ferrara's inability to govern his own students is undoubtedly a matter
of interest only to Ferrara."7 5 Parents might justifiably question the
validity of this bold conclusion.
As to Ferrara's complaints about unqualified teachers, the court
once again concluded that no public concern was implicated.76 In so
deciding, the court placed some emphasis on the fact that Ferrara was
motivated by personal concerns-that he would not be able to teach
the classes he wanted to teach. "We hold merely that a public em-
ployee may not transform a personal grievance into a matter of public
concern by invoking a supposed popular interest in the way public in-
stitutions are run."77
70. Id at 238.
71. One Supreme Court Justice has opined that there should be no need for constitu-
tional analysis in cases like Page. Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S. Ct. 2891, 2900
(1987)(Powell, J., concurring):
There is no dispute that McPherson's comment was made during a pri-
vate conversation with a co-worker who happened to be her boyfriend.
She had no intention or expectation that it would be overheard or acted
on by others. Given this, I think it is unnecessary to engage in the exten-
sive analysis normally required by [Connick and Picketing].
Id. at 2901 (Powell, J., concurring).
72. 781 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1986).
73. Id. at 1510-11.
74. Ferrara v. Mills, 596 F. Supp. 1069, 1071 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
75. Ferrara v. Mills, 781 F.2d 1508, 1515-16 (11th Cir. 1986).
76. Id. at 1516.
77. Id. One cannot help but wonder whether the court, in its determination of the
public concern test, also had in mind the comparatively innocuous "sanction"
given the teacher in Ferrara. While teaching assignments are indeed important to
those affected, the severity of the sanction pales when compared to the typical
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Few people will vigorously fight for any goal unless they have a
personal motive for seeing the goal achieved. Courts that consider this
personal motive to remove the expression from the realm of public
concern do a great disservice to the educational profession. As evident
in Ferrara, "personal" motives can spark heated discussion about top-
ics which must be of great concern to those interested in seeing public
education succeed. Removing these comments from the category of
public concern seems tantamount to saying that a presidential candi-
date's remarks are not of public concern because, after all, she wants
to be president.
One final case will complete the illustration on how motive can
defeat a claim of public concern. In Callaway v. Hafeman,78 Franzetta
Callaway, a human relations officer for a local school district, received
what she claimed to be a de facto demotion after making complaints
regarding sexual harassment by her boss. 79 Ms. Callaway made the
complaints privately and informally because "she did not want to
make a public issue of the allegations."0 Callaway also was openly
critical of the reorganization plan under which she was reassigned.
The district court dismissed her first amendment claims, and the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. "While the content of
Callaway's communications touched upon an issue of public concern
generally, she was not attempting to speak out as a citizen concerned
with problems facing the school district; instead, she spoke as an em-
ployee attempting to resolve her private dilemma."8 ' Because such
speech, in its form and context, does not implicate matters of public
concern, it is unprotected by the first amendment.
Notably, the court in Callaway did not mention the Supreme Court
holding in Givhan v. Western Line8 2 that private as well as public
expression is protected. Instead, the court stressed the private nature
of the speech in order to conclude that the employee's role was not
one of a concerned citizen. Given the fact that Connick's three-prong
test arose after the decision in Givhan, one must question whether
Givhan's holding still stands. Callaway vividly demonstrates how two
of the Connick prongs, context and form, can easily drag down the
status of speech even though the content seems to implicate matters of
public concern. Ironically, had Franzetta Callaway chosen to take her
dispute to the public (thereby damaging the reputation and public con-
fidence in the school system), her speech, it seems, would have been
teacher termination case. This author suspects that, had the sanction in Ferrara
been termination, the public issue test may well have been decided in favor of the
teacher.
78. 832 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1987).
79. Id. at 415.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 417.
82. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
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protected.8 3
Not all courts appear so concerned with the role or motive of the
speaker. Some courts, in the discharge of their duty to answer the
public concern question, appear to place more importance on the con-
tent of the speech at issue. Decisions in these cases are characterized
by broad, sweeping conclusions classifying certain topics of discussion
as "obviously" of public concern.8 4
In Lewis v. Harrison School District No. 1,85 the court was faced
with a first amendment claim asserted by a high school principal. Bill
and Judy Lewis, husband and wife, were employed at Harrison High
School. In 1979, Judy Lewis was elected to a committee of the local
teacher's association, pursuant to which she wrote a letter to the su-
perintendent, criticizing some of the school board's policies.8 6 The su-
perintendent then told Bill Lewis to "muzzle" his wife.s 7
Mrs. Lewis subsequently was notified that she would be trans-
ferred, and Mr. Lewis requested a school board meeting to protest the
proposed transfer. At the meeting, Bill Lewis and others expressed
their concern about the lack of "common sense" in the transfer deci-
sion, accusing the superintendent of being unprofessional.8 8 One and
one-half months later, Mr. Lewis received word that his contract as
principal would not be renewed for the upcoming school year. He
then filed suit.
The district court set aside a jury verdict for the plaintiff, and ruled
that as a matter of law Lewis's comments were not entitled to first
amendment protection. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated
the judgment notwithstanding the verdict and remanded with instruc-
tions to enter judgment for the plaintiff.8 9
Had the court employed a motive test, a strong case could have
been made that Lewis's speech was not of public concern. He was
speaking on a topic of keen interest to him-the impending transfer of
his wife. Furthermore, the transfer was a subject of internal school
policy; it involved an employment decision which had been made by
the school board.
The court, however, disregarded the motive factor. "Because the
teachers and coaches in a public school district can deeply impact chil-
dren's lives, school personnel assignments obviously are of considera-
83. Although, as we shall see, this is a double-edged sword, by making her accusa-
tions public, the factors under the Pickering balance begin to weight more heav-
ily against the speaker.
84. Lewis v. Harrison School Dist. No. 1, 805 F.2d 310 (8th Cir. 1986).
85. Id.
86. Id at 311.
87. Id. at 312.
88. Ia
89. Id at 311.
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ble concern to those children, their parents, and others in the
community."90 Lewis's comments, then, were held to be of public con-
cern merely on an analysis of their content.
Additional Eighth Circuit cases use the same type of broad lan-
guage seen in Lewis. "The questions of how we teach the young, what
we teach them, and the environment in which we teach them are of
the most central concern to every community in the nation."91 As one
commentator has noted, "the Eighth Circuit has continued to take a
broad view of what constitutes speech dealing with matters of public
concern.... It has declined to apply the form and context analysis and
hold that speech of public interest in content was not of 'public
concern.' "92
The variety of approaches and results under the public concern test
points out a major flaw in its use. Teachers who wish to speak out on
matters they consider important have no way of knowing whether the
comments they make will be held to be of public concern. Indeed,
judges familiar with these concepts have differing opinions regarding
the same or similar fact patterns. As the Supreme Court noted in
Keyishian v. Board of Regents:93 "When one must guess what conduct
or utterance may lose him his position, one necessarily will 'steer far
wider of the unlawful zone. . . . "94 Because the content, form, and
context analysis is not amenable to predictability, it seems reasonable
that teachers would avoid expressing themselves in close cases. This
"chilling effect" has been noted with disapproval in other first amend-
ment contexts.
To avoid this chilling effect, a test that is capable of uniform appli-
cation and that lends itself to predictable results must be developed.
This author seriously doubts whether such a public concern test can
be developed. An alternative is to provide a public concern test with a
"zone of comfort," so that some comments, which under the present
Connick test are of private concern, would nonetheless be constitu-
tionally protected. Employing this protective device would make it
easier for the teacher, calculating his chances on being terminated for
arguably protected activity, to decide to go ahead with the conduct.
Such a protective device might be provided by placing the burden on
the school board to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
comment was not of public concern.
90. d2 at 314. The court then went on to compare the facts of Lewis with those of
Cox v. Dardanelle Public School Dist., 790 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1986). In Cox, the
court held that a teacher's grievance with her principal's policies constituted a
matter of public concern because they dealt with the faculty's ability to discharge
the public function of education. Id. at 673.
91. Cox v. Dardanelle Public School Dist., 790 F.2d 668, 673 (8th Cir. 1986).
92. Note, supra note 60, at 613.
93. 385 U.S. 589 (1966).
94. Id. at 604 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
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Even less drastic alternatives could strengthen the test somewhat.
Answering crucial questions regarding the application of the content,
form, and context test would be a start. How strongly is each factor to
be weighed? Can content alone be determinative of public concern?
How do the form and context factors apply in cases in which the
teacher airs her concerns in a one-on-one situation? Answering these
and other important questions that exist with regard to the Connick
test may make the test more palatable.
As mentioned previously, if a court determines that the content,
form, and context of the speech call for a conclusion that it is not of
public concern, no further analysis need be done. The teacher, absent
most unusual circumstances, will not be constitutionally protected.
When the speech is deemed to be of public concern, the court must go
on to the second stage of the Pickering-Connick test-balancing.
B. Pickering Balancing Test
The fashion in which courts apply the balancing test is as unpre-
dictable as the application of the public concern test. The first job of
any court in seeking to balance the respective interests of the school
and the teacher is to identify factors which will play significant roles
in the balance. The Pickering court provided some guidance by out-
lining some of the factors which should be considered. 95 These factors
have been restated and enumated as follows:
1) the need for harmony in the workplace;
2) the need for maintenance of close working relationships between employ-
ees and supervisors;
3) the time, place, and manner of the speech;
4) the context of the speech;
5) the degree to which the speech addresses matters of public interest;
6) the degree to which the speech impeded the employee's ability to perform
her duties.9 6
Note that some of the factors listed, such as context and public in-
terest, seem to mesh with the analysis under the public concern test.
Perhaps this contributed to the previously mentioned confusion some
courts encountered when attempting to apply the combined tests. For
example, two Eighth Circuit opinions completely disregard the public
concern test, applying only a Picketing analysis with strong focus on
the public interest factor.97 In both cases, a strong argument can be
made that the speech at issue indeed involved matters of public con-
cern, but the court never performed the necessary analysis to make
that determination.
95. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569-71 (1968).
96. Hamer v. Brown, 831 F.2d 1398, 1402 (8th Cir. 1987).
97. Raposa v. Meade School Dist. 46-1, 790 F.2d 1349 (8th Cir. 1986); Bowman v. Pu-
laski County Special School Dist., 723 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1983).
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In the larger scheme, the balancing test always will involve a focus
on whether the teacher's right to speak on matters of public concern is
outweighed by the school's asserted interest in controlling the work-
place. The degree to which the school environment must be disrupted
before school board action will be constitutionally permissible is quite
uncertain. The Court in Connick appeared to allow a great deal of
employer discretion in the determination of when to take action.
"[W]e do not see the necessity for an employer to allow events to un-
fold to the extent that the disruption of the office.., is manifest.... ,,98
When criticisms are leveled directly at a co-worker or supervisor,
the factor concerning the need for close working relationships be-
comes paramount. For example, in Cox v. Dardanelle Public School
District,99 the court considered the constitutionality of a teacher's dis-
charge for comments critical of the principal's administration of the
educational process.100 After finding that Cox's speech dealt with
matters of public concern, the court went on to analyze the Pickering
factors. Since a majority of the teachers agreed with Cox's comments,
the court concluded that there had been no disharmony between the
teachers caused by the criticisms. As to the relationship between Cox
and the principal, the court commented:
Although we do not intend to minimize the importance of the teacher-princi-
pal relationship, it is not a 'relationship between superior and subordinate...
of such a personal and intimate nature that certain forms of [ ] criticism of the
superior by the subordinate would seriously undermine the effectiveness of
the working relationship between them .... ' The teacher-principal relation-
ship is not of such a personal and intimate nature that teachers must be pre-
cluded from filing responsible grievances. 1 0 '
Thus, as long as the teacher's comments satisfy the public concern
test, Cox might be used to provide protection to teacher comments
critical of her own principal.
A teacher will frequently lose at the balancing stage if a court finds
that the expression at issue hindered his ability to perform his job. An
interesting example is provided by Patterson v. Masem.10 2 In Patter-
son, a teacher claimed that she was not appointed supervisor of Eng-
lish and social studies because of her objections to the performance of
the play "You Can't Take it With You." 103 Ms. Patterson had been
given the task of mediating a dispute over racial inequities in the
play's production. Instead of calming the situation, however, Patter-
98. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983). The Court did caution, however, that
if speech is shown to be of strong public concern, a more substantial showing of
disruption might be required. Id&
99. 790 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1986).
100. Id. at 671.
101. Id. at 674 (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 570 n.3 (1968)(cita-
tions omitted)).
102. 774 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1985).
103. I& at 253.
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son found herself in agreement with minorities who felt they were
being discriminated against. Patterson's requests that the play be can-
celled were categorized by the superintendent as "neither appropriate
nor in good faith."104
The court concluded that Patterson's first amendment claim was
without merit.
Here a play was selected by the school district (or by the drama teacher, to
whom such authority had been delegated); it was Dr. Patterson's duty to re-
spect the district's choice. While her conduct did indeed address a matter of
public concern, it also interfered with the proper performance of her job.1 0 5
The unique character of Patterson's duty with respect to the play-
mediation-obviously had some impact on the court's decision. She
was given an assignment that, in the court's view, required her to stifle
her own opinions. Because she "failed" to perform this task, the ac-
tion taken against her was not constitutionally unsound.
Because of the variety of fact patterns encountered by courts, and
because of the number of factors which may be weighted differently in
each court's decision, it is simply impossible to predict how a court will
view any given case. As a result, the balancing test suffers the same
infirmity as the public concern test; teachers seeking to speak out,
even on issues of clear public concern, have no guarantee against pos-
sible termination as a result of their speaking.
The combination of the Pickering-Connick tests creates an even
more disturbing catch-22 problem. In order to be of public concern,
the speech must, under some formulations, deal with the manner in
which the institution discharges its duties. Speech critical of the func-
tioning of the institution, however, may not fare well under the bal-
ancing test. Such speech will undoubtedly create a certain amount of
tension and conflict within the institution-tension that the employer
will want to extricate.
Scholars have been critical of the use of balancing tests in constitu-
tional decision making.106 Even the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has
derogated the Pickering balancing test, saying that the test "inevitably
chills some protected activity." 07 Given the seemingly inherent flaws
of the test, it may be wise to consider dropping it altogether, leaving
the Connick test as the only hurdle that must be cleared to establish a
first amendment violation. This would leave teachers free to com-
ment on matters of public concern without fear of retaliatory dis-
charge (assuming, of course, that the statements were not made with
104. Id
105. Id at 257.
106. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877
(1963). Emerson criticized balancing tests because, among other reasons, they
give "no real meaning to the first amendment" and they do not afford "the indi-
vidual adequate advance notice of the rights to be protected." Id. at 912.
107. Gonzales v. Benavides, 774 F.2d 1295, 1303 (5th Cir. 1985).
1988]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
actual malice). Thus, the public school teacher would be as free from
state sanction as the private citizen.
For now, however, the system remains unpredictable. How best to
deal with this unpredictability is a matter faced by litigators and edu-
cators every working day. It is also a problem that should, but unfor-
tunately has not, confronted a third group of professionals deeply
concerned with the success of the education system: the lobbyist.
IV. LESSONS FOR THE PROFESSIONALS
The lesson for the educator is simple and short: Until the system
changes, there is simply no way to tell whether certain speech will be
protected by the Constitution. If a teacher chooses to speak, she
should consider not only the content of her expression, but also the
form and context in which she speaks. She should seek to minimize
any perceived "personal interest" she might have in the subject of
communication. All of these may help the teacher clear the public
concern issue, making constitutional protection of her statements
possible.
Perhaps it also may be wise for a public educator to consider a
"mitigation of damages" approach to expression concerning his em-
ployment. If disruption of the educational process can be kept at a
minimum, the speech may weigh heavily when it comes to the Picker-
ing balance. Above all, the educator should consider the expression's
potential impact on his job performance (both for constitutional and
educational reasons). If the speech impedes the teacher's ability to
perform his assigned duty, it almost certainly will be unprotected.
Litigators representing teachers in employment termination cases
face some of the same problems. Characterizing a case factually as
something much more than an employee dispute is extremely impor-
tant. While the public concern test and the balancing test are matters
of law, a court may be required to consider the factual findings of a
jury when rendering its decision on those issues.
Litigators also should consider whether they want to bring these
actions in state court, assuming the state has a statute similar to sec-
tion 1983. While the foregoing analysis controls when a teacher claims
she was fired in violation of the United States Constitution, state con-
stitutional analysis need not be so restrictive. Many states have only
begun to brave the waters of independent constitutional analysis. For
litigators seeking to use this tool, the unfortunate fact is that the text
of most state constitutional free speech clauses are similar or identical
to the text of the first amendment. When there are few textual dis-
tinctions between the corresponding constitutional guarantees, many
courts will simply choose to adopt federal reasoning to determine the
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meaning of their own state constitution.'0 8
Some state constitutions, however, have free speech clauses that
seem to require independent analysis to derive their meaning. For ex-
ample, article I, section 5, of the Nebraska Constitution provides:
"Every person may freely speak, write, and publish on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of that liberty; and in all trials for li-
bel, both civil and criminal, the truth when published with good mo-
tives, and for justifiable ends, shall be a sufficient defense."109 When a
state constitutional provision differs so markedly from its federal
counterpart, a strong case can be made that a state court should not
feel bound by a more restrictive interpretation of the corresponding
federal right.110
Lobbyists and state educational associations typically carry a good
deal of political power. Some of these associations may want to con-
sider drafting a statute which would provide greater protection to the
public school teacher fired or demoted for expressive reasons. Such a
statute could incorporate the previously mentioned suggestion that
teachers be absolutely protected for any speech addressing issues of
public concern.
V. CONCLUSION
Rights thought sacred by the first amendment are, under the cur-
rent Pickering-Connick test, in jeopardy. Teachers are much more
susceptible to government action in violation of the Constitution be-
cause they, unlike others, rely on the government for a monthly
paycheck. Instead of recognizing the vast influence that governmental
action can have on a teacher's communicative activity, courts have
chosen to vindicate the rights of the government as employer. Tipping
the scales in this fashion assures that our most valuable educational
resource, our teachers, will be muzzled.
Change, which keeps our school system vital, can be fostered only
by encouraging free expression among its professionals. Only when
professional educators are permitted to speak without fear of sanction
will our school system benefit from the best, brightest, and most inno-
vative thinking. When we unmuzzle our educators, we release our
potential.
John M. Ryan '88
108. See, e.g., State v. Havlat, 222 Neb. 554, 385 N.W.2d 436 (1986).
109. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 5.
110. See Symposium The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REv. 959
(1985); Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection
of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REV. 353 (1984).
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